1 Remilitarization in this paper is defined as increasing acceptance by Japan's policy-makers and its citizenry of the efficacy and centrality of military power for national security ends. Japan has thus moved from an early post-war demilitarized state, to now adopt an expanded military role in terms of function, geographical scope, and external partnerships, and a new preparedness to exercise armed force for security purposes not only individually but through (CSD). The militarization of space involves a similar process of eroding past constraints on this dimension of military power; the overt appropriation of space as a military domain and the procurement of military space capabilities by the Japan Ministry of Defense and (JSDF); the extension of military cooperation in space to encompass the external partnership of the U.S.-Japan alliance; and a set of domestic policy institutions and norms embedded within policy elites and the general public increasingly conducive to military space activities. The militarization of space does not as yet equate to the weaponization of space capabilities but rather their use to support military activities in the land, sea and air domains. Further elaboration of the benchmarking for judging the militarization of space is offered in subsequent sections of the paper. 2 The Abe administration's reforms consist of Japan's first National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Security Council (NSC) in December 2013; revisions of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) in the same month; a State Secrecy Law, again in the same month; adoption of the Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers in April 2014; and a revised Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in February 2015 allowing for the transfer of aid to foreign militaries if for humanitarian and disaster relief purposes. In U.S.-Japan relations, the Abe administration in April 2015 effected the first revision of the Defense Guidelines since 1997, and most significantly passed a raft of security bills in the National Diet in September 2015: The Law on Response to Contingencies, enabling Japan's exercise of the right of CSD in scenarios where an attack on another state in a close relationship with Japan poses a clear danger to overturning the Japanese people's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, where there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack, and where the use of force is restricted to the minimum necessary to repel the attack; Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing the 1999 Regional Contingencies Law and designed to boost Japanese non-combat logistical support for the U.S. and now other states regionally and even globally; International Peace Support Law, removing the need for Japan to enact separate laws for each JSDF dispatch to provide logistical support to multinational forces; and revisions to the International Peace Cooperation Law, enabling the JSDF during UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) to use force in pursuing certain duties rather than just defending JSDF personnel.
space activities, as a driver of broader military-strategic change, Japan is starting to fundamentally deviate from its post-war grand strategy of the "Yoshida Doctrine."
In the midst of a changing regional balance of power, with China's rise and Japan's search for a more proactive foreign and security policy, mainstream academic policy discourse in Japan and the U.S. has tended to stress fundamental continuity. Abe's and other administrations' security reforms are cast as moderate, positive for the alliance and international community, fully in line with previous national and bilateral strategic postures, and tempered by domestic political and international constraints.
3 Japan is presented as continuing to follow a pragmatic line in the face of domestic and international constraints, a focus on proactive diplomacy and economic engagement, and continued incremental and minimalist contributions to the bilateral alliance. 4 In short, Japan is seen to eventually rebound to the essential tenets of the Yoshida line, and even any "post-Yoshida consensus" is likely to be a modification of rather than fundamental breakout from the existing grand strategy.
This paper challenges the "Abe as aberration" view, arguing that Japan's militarization of space represents the vanguard of a longer-term maneuvering, started by Abe's predecessors and accelerating under his administration, toward a policy of increasingly open deterrence and containment of North Korea and China, and a commitment to gamechanging U.S.-Japan military cooperation and strategy that move far beyond the traditional "Yoshida script". 5 Further, it is vital to correctly understand Japan's new security direction because it impacts so greatly on the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's choices matter: to the U.S.'s need for a more capable and forthcoming Japanese ally in effecting its "rebalance" strategy, and even more for East Asian neighbors that perceive Japan as a potential partner or adversary.
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To make these arguments, the paper proceeds in six sections. The first creates a framework of baselines for assessing potential continuity or change in Japan's grand strategy by identifying the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine-comprising the strategic outlook of policy-makers making for a minimalist orientation of national security policy and alliance commitments, constraints on military capabilities, and formal and informal domestic security institutions and prohibitions and norms limiting the usage of military power-that need to be overridden for any major shift in security trajectory. The second explains the central importance of the militarization of space for driving and illustrating broader changes across all dimensions of Japanese security policy and military power in the same way as it permeates the efforts of other advanced states involved in network-centric warfare and Defense Transformation and 5 Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," p. 118. 6 Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, visited Tokyo in February 2017 to offer assurances that the fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance remained unchanged despite statements by President Donald J. Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign suggesting a pull back from U.S. security commitments. Michael R. Gordon and Mokoto Rich, "Jim Mattis Says U.S. Is 'Shoulder to Shoulder' With Japan," New York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/usjapan-mattis-abe-defense.html?_r=0.
demonstrates the ways in which space programs contain the potential to challenge each of the Yoshida Doctrine's core tenets. 7 The third section investigates the extent that Japan's space programs have actually begun to challenge these key tenets, in regard to the transformation of Japan's strategic orientation and desire to boost national efforts to balance security threats internally through its own national capabilities and externally via the U.S.-Japan alliance, and through both balancing mechanisms significantly enhancing deterrence mainly by 'denial' but now increasingly also by 'punishment'.
The fourth demonstrates the ways in which Japan's space programs have begun to bring about a qualitative step change away from past constraints through the procurement by all services of the JSDF of increasingly powerful military space technologies and of other military capabilities and doctrines in the maritime, air and land domains fundamentally reliant on space for their effective operation. It further explores how Japan has begun to place its space capabilities at the disposal of the U.S.-Japan alliance, with a new preparedness for the integration of bilateral strategic deterrence, and crucially precipitating the revision of constitutional interpretations on the exercise of CSD that impact on all dimensions of Japanese security. The fifth examines the role of space programs in leading the way for a significant strengthening of domestic policymaking institutions and public opinion to facilitate Japan's more robust military profile, including the breaching of a key anti-militaristic prohibition on the peaceful use of space. These sections drawing on new empirical information-including internal party political, government, and industrial documents and interviews with key policy-7 A military that can effectively occupy the "strategic high ground" of space has a tremendous advantage in terms of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), maneuverability, and firepower. makers-demonstrate the significant upscaling of military space programs and Japan's resolve to pursue a more radical security policy. Overall, the conclusion argues that Japan's militarization of space has been accompanied by the jettisoning of the central tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine and that the ongoing transformation of its security trajectory is now revealed as "hiding in plain sight".
Gauging the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine
To gauge the role and impact of the militarization of space as a case study for understanding Japan's security trajectory, this paper offers a framework for assessing and making plain the extent of shifts in overall security strategy as judged against the benchmarks of continuity or change in the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine. If the militarization of space can be demonstrated to be effecting transformation in these core tenets, then, given the increasing influence of space across all dimensions of military planning and capabilities, and the centrality of the doctrine itself to Japan's security trajectory to date, this challenges not only assumptions of essential continuity in Japanese security policy but also indicates the potential for step change in grand strategy.
It is important to note that the Yoshida Doctrine as a grand strategy is not static and has evolved in the post-war period, moving from an original foreign policy line (Yoshida rosen) under Prime Minister Yoshida in the early 1950s, to a more systemized doctrine (Yoshida dokutorin) as Japan has incrementally expanded its national capabilities to engage in security responsibilities alongside the U.S. and its partners. Nonetheless, the consensus is that the Yoshida Doctrine still provides the central framework for assessing shifts in Japanese security policy. This is due to the fact that all the main policy and academic analyses, of all ideological and paradigmatic stripes, concur that its core tenets, even if continually tested and stretched, have remained essentially intact into the contemporary period.
In establishing the core tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine and identifying the baselines for any potential shifts or continuity in Japanese security, most analysts judge the degree of its durability in terms of Japanese policy-makers' outlook on the international security environment and whether they still calculate an overall equilibrium in the regional balance of power, retain confidence in U.S. security guarantees, remain conscious of the risks of abandonment, but most especially entrapment in US military strategy, and thus maintain minimalist commitments to bilateral security cooperation. over security policy; and the persistence of anti-militaristic principles and norms. 12 All these core tenets are summarized in Table 1 , and thus provide a framework against which the impact of the militarization of space can be calibrated in challenging the Yoshida Doctrine.
The militarization of space as central for gauging changes in Japanese security
Japan's space programs are in some ways the "hard test" and yet ideal case for assessing shifts in the framework outlined above of Japanese security policy. Japan's space programs are "hard" in the sense that for over forty years since 1969 and the National Diet PPR, space policy has been paraded as a paragon of self-imposed restraints on remilitarization. Analysts have interpreted Japanese space policy as either lacking a national security angle, or as reinforcing just how minimally its security strategy has changed. Japan, the consensus asserts, stands as a non-security-related and normative exception to regional and global trends for the militarization of space in seeking space technology for its own sake and civilian "soft power" ends.
However, this paper posits that Japan's space programs are in fact pivotal for assessing the framework of the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine and potential changes in Japan's security trajectory. First, Japan's space programs pose fundamental questions relating to the continuity of security policy given that over the last two decades, but especially over the last eight years culminating in the publication of the most recent space strategy, there has been a move toward increasingly overt militarization and challenge to their previously perceived position as reinforcing the security status quo. 17 The NDPG will increase the MSDF's destroyer fleet from forty-eight to fifty-four, including the addition of two further Aegis BMD-equipped destroyers to the existing four Kongō-class and two Atagoclass vessels. The MSDF will continue to procure four new 25DD Akizuki-class multi-mission destroyers, and two 27,000 ton 22/24DDH Izumo-class helicopter carriers embarking up to 14 helicopters, providing a very strong ASW capability and versatile naval assets. MSDF submarine capabilities increase significantly, with the revised NDPG and MTDP continuing the 2010 NDPG's build-up of the MSDF fleet from sixteen to twenty-two boats, and the introduction of the Sōryū-class submarine platform providing leading-edge air-independent and fuel-cell propulsion. The MSDF's air fleet is strengthened through the procurement of the P-1 with an 8,000-kilometer range capable of patrolling and ASW operations deep into the South China Sea. The revised NDPG and MTDP maintain the ASDF's acquisition of forty-two F-35A fifth-generation fighters. The ASDF continues to procure the 6,500-kilometer range C-2 transport; BMD Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3; and is set to procure unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to patrol Japan's extensive coastline and remote islands. The GSDF will create a 3,000 personnel unit akin to a marine corps for the retaking of remote islands, equipped with 52 amphibious armored personnel carriers and 17 MV-22 Osprey aircraft. , 1992) . On Japan's use of "paramilitary" units to disguise Japan's armed force, see Richard J. Samuels, '"New Fighting Power!": Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security," International Security Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007 /2008 determination to maintain minimalist national and alliance commitments, should be expected to take a more radical line, and embed outer space in national security strategy and doctrines for internal balancing and within alliance relations for external balancing, and extending even to breaching the ban on CSD.
In turn, to function as a significant military player in space and other military dimensions, and thus to challenge the Yoshida Doctrine's focus on constraining the build-up and usage of military capabilities, Japan should be prepared to develop space capabilities that supersede previous limitations in projecting power and supporting alliance activities to enable greatly enhanced deterrence by denial and increasingly punishment. Japan's seriousness of intent in developing such capabilities is likely to be seen in the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) and JSDF attempting to match the triad of space systems deployed by the existing major space powers of the U.S and China that serve respectively as Japan's ally and principal regional protagonist, and as outlined in Table 2 . 
New space threats and alliance demands
Japan in the 1990s became increasingly conscious of security threats related to space creating an environment for the militarization of dual-use space technologies. North
Korea's test launch of a Taepodong-1 missile across the Japanese archipelago in August 1998, the "Taepodong shock," exposed Japan's vulnerability to ballistic missiles. In turn, Japan's growing anxieties have been compounded by concerns over U.S.-Japan alliance solidity. After the Cold War, Japan's concerns over entrapment have been increasingly overtaken by the opposite concerns of strategic and technological decoupling from the U.S. and the risk of abandonment-concerns witnessed in Japan's attempts to extract explicit guarantees from the U.S. that the scope of the security treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands, and recently heightened initially with the advent of the Donald J. Trump administration's "America First" policies, determination to press U.S. allies on upping their own defense budgets and burden-sharing, and discussion of scenarios of Japan and South Korea possibly possessing their own nuclear deterrents, that hints at a U.S. policy of offshore balancing and potential abandonment of Japan.
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Japan's national disadvantages in military space vis-à-vis the U.S. have been recognized since the 1990s, and particularly in access to space-based ISR-disadvantages that deprive policy-makers of tactical and strategic autonomy over JSDF deployments and commitments to support the U.S. in conflict situations. 29 Japan later took note of the 2010 NSSS and 2014 Quadrennial Review that asserted the U.S.'s need to maintain superiority in space through more resilient systems, including diversified ISR, SSA, MDA, and space-based precision strike; and that the U.S. can in part achieve this through partnering with "allies and other responsible nations," and the expansion of access to allied ISR systems and collaborative development of space capabilities. 31 The implication now was that Japan needed to build up its own space programs to stave off risks of abandonment. Japan's 2016 Basic Space Plan fully endorses this approach, devoting its crucial opening statements to how Japan must boost independent military space capabilities (jiritsusei kakuho) in order to fully support the U.S.
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Space positioned centrally in national security strategy Japan's recognition of a changing external security environment has now initiated an effort for the significant militarization of its space programs, maneuvering space to the forefront of national security strategy and procuring key capabilities. Japan's initial reaction to the "Taepodong shock" was, within months of the incident, to initiate its IGS 
Japanese breakout capabilities for internal balancing
Japan's evolution of a national military space strategy, emerging JSDF doctrines in relation to space-based threats and assets, and specific space capability procurement plans are suggestive of an emerging action-reaction dynamic, or even proto-space arms race, and apparent active power-balancing. Regarding internal power-balancing efforts, Japan has thus far demonstrated increasingly impressive follow through on its space capability build-up to a level that goes far beyond longstanding postwar constraints.
This section and Table 2 below demonstrate that Japan has begun to procure a plethora of advanced military space capabilities matching, or in some cases even exceeding, those of China, and enabling far more robust deterrence by denial, as well as moves toward deterrence by punishment.
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Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, January 9, 2015, http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan2/plan2.pdf, pp. 4-5.
To counter regional threats, Japan is building out its space triad. For intelligence, Japan is already doubling its IGS satellite fleet, consisting of electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar technology (SAR), and is building new fleets of dual-purpose advanced optical and radar observation satellites. 47 For communications and navigation, Japan has developed or is developing a satellite laser communications system based on the OICETS/Kirari test satellite and an advanced data relay satellite to deal with the burgeoning ISR data demands, and the full seven-satellite constellation QZSS system.
Further, Japan is considering both space-based SIGINT and/or ELINT capabilities derived from the ETS-VIII program, despite already possessing an advanced land-based capability.
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Japan's MDA capabilities are currently vested respectively in the ALOS-2 and ALOS-3 programs, the latter with a military-effective 80cm resolution that will also host a BMD EW sensor for the JMOD, and, therefore, the MSDF and ASDF. oriented nature of the budget means that Japan could be in effect adding to its defense outlays, outside the formal JMOD expenditure and one percent of GNP framework, the equivalent of five to ten per cent of the current budget.
Space capabilities in service of the U.S.-Japan alliance
Japanese internal balancing in the domain of space is increasingly matched by similar external balancing via the U.S.-Japan alliance and designed to mitigate abandonment.
These efforts in space supersede greatly Japan's prior minimalist alliance contribution; enhance its strategic cooperation with the U.S.; expand its commitment to defensive responsibilities alongside the U.S. outside its immediate territory; integrate its capabilities with those of the U.S.; and not only facilitate but indeed have been largely responsible for initiating the breach on the ban of the exercise of CSD.
The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the "two-plus-two", inserted in its June 2011 Joint Statement that the alliance, in addition to ongoing bilateral BMD projects, would strengthen cooperation on "other evolving threats, such as to outer space" and specifically in SSA, MDA, QZSS, and dual-use sensors. 56 The U.S. Japan's determination to expand cooperation with the U.S. into the militarization of outer space has in turn functioned as a persistent and principal driver for the eventual breach on the ban on the exercise of CSD with deep ramifications for the alliance and Japanese security policy overall. For effective real-time operation of space-related BMD systems, Japan and the U.S. require the increasing integration of bilateral informationsharing and command and control. Japan's Aegis system is highly interoperable, utilizing the same capabilities in maritime and space-based sensor technologies, data linking, and the co-developed SM-3 BLK-IIA missile. The MSDF's Aegis system is inherently mobile and deployable alongside U.S. Navy assets whether in and around Japan or in other waters, thus raising the expectation that the U.S. will request Japanese BMD support in a variety of contingencies outside the traditional scope of the security treaty. Japanese defense planners denied initially that BMD carried implications for CSD, but their U.S. counterparts consistently and publicly stressed that for the system's optimal deployment in support of the alliance it was necessary for Japan to lift the ban on the exercise the right. The militarization of space programs under the framework of the alliance and CSD represents, therefore, a fundamental shift in Japan's regional military role. Japan's acquisition of ISR systems and QZSS, increasingly linked together and with U.S.
systems via data fusion, now provide a "triple play" of advanced space technologies that greatly multiply Japanese deterrent power, and more significantly the U.S.-Japan judgement, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgement based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors. alliance's deterrent power, through both denial and punishment, vis-à-vis China's capabilities.
First, Japan's new capabilities will provide a persistent and pervasive ISR capability to track an adversary's military deployments and exchange real-time data with the U.S., meaning that the PLA cannot easily hide from Japanese or U.S.-Japan alliance capabilities. Second, Japan's acquisition of precision navigation and timing (PNT) strike capability through GPS and/or QZSS-guided ASDF JDAMs, means that the PLA, once exposed to space-based tracking, can also no longer evade being a target of Japanese and U.S. capabilities. Third, in addition to land and maritime ISR and even space-based SIGINT and ELINT, Japan's move to acquire space-based EW through its own infrared satellites and by linking with the U.S. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) assets will mean that any adversary such as the PLA will find it hard not only to hide or evade but also to be able to strike back whether first or early against Japanese and U.S.-Japan capabilities.
All this can be imagined to have major implications for the prosecution and outcome of specific conflict situations involving China. Japan has committed to the protection of U.S. maritime assets under the 2015 revised Defense Guidelines and CSD legislation. Japan's advanced space technologies looking to work in "seamless" cooperation with those of the U.S., a leitmotif of the revised Defense Guidelines, mark a significant new stage in the development and leveraging of JSDF capabilities and U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. It may have a potentially key impact on the U.S.-Japan-China strategic balance. Such complementary and accretive space-based capabilities, exchange of ISR data, and preparedness to buttress U.S. space infrastructure, clearly strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance interoperability and its deterrence posture. Through the QZSS system and its role as a substitute for U.S. GPS, Japan places itself on the very front line as a primary target in a conflict with any adversary, but especially China. While obviating the risks of U.S. abandonment, Japan is actually undertaking renewed risks of entrapment, and so sacrificing the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine as the cost of strategic commitment to the U.S. in space and maintenance of this aspect of the global commons.
In turn, it can be envisaged that China might perceive these developments as even aggressive in orientation. Full spectrum dominance threatens to deprive China of the ability to hide, evade or strike back and to thus negate its own normal deterrence capabilities. The temptation, then might be for China to launch, in line with its doctrine of asymmetric warfare, preemptive or blanket kinetic, directed-energy or cyber strikes to degrade Japanese ISR assets and restore strategic parity in an impending conflict. In this sense, then, Japanese militarization of space activities could prove highly escalatory for U.S.-Japan-China security tensions.
Domestic policy-making institutions and space militarization
Japan's militarization of space to pursue behaviors approximating to internal and external power balancing demonstrates the start of clear departures from the Yoshida Doctrine. These changes are also matched by shifts in the disposition of domestic agents and norms. The erosion of the PPR began with the "Taepodong shock" that created an environment conducive for the IGS program. This initial shift to the defensive use of space was presented as fitting within PPR apparent parameters: IGS satellites were classified as information-gathering (jōhō shūshū) and "multi-purpose" (tamoku-teki) despite their essentially primary military rationale. 82 But thereafter the "exclusively peaceful" use of space norm has been abandoned. The Basic Space Law jettisoned the PPR, passing the National Diet with 221 in favor, and only fourteen against, with cross-party support from the LDP, DPJ, and New Kōmeitō. 83 Crucially, Japanese public opinion, often thought as the final "immovable object" of anti-militarist principles, has shown itself to be flexible about the military use of space. 84 The IGS and introduction of BMD aroused little public opposition. 85 Cabinet shown that Japan's former strategic calculus over security policy is fundamentally shifting, becoming increasingly dominated by international systemic pressures, concerns over abandonment rather than entrapment, the need to more actively maintain alliance ties, and to a build-up of capabilities for internal and external balancing-all indicating a shift to a more proactive military stance.
Aligning policy structures for a military-strategic space orientation
Second, Japan has embedded space at the forefront of national and U.S.-Japan alliance security strategy and deploys a triad of national space capabilities in launch vehicles, satellites, and counterspace that competes with, or even gains superiority over, if seen in the context of ever-closer interoperability with U.S. space resources, those of its main security adversary China. Japan's space technologies even now hint at offensive power projection and augmenting a recessed nuclear option for deterrence by Japan's lack of reticence to form part of the frontline of deterrence, and to move toward abandoning hedging and to accept the risks of entrapment and make full operational commitments to U.S. regional strategy, as seen in the case of space, are hardly redolent of the Yoshida Doctrine.
In conclusion, therefore, the paper asserts that Japanese space activities indicate a trajectory heading away from the Yoshida Doctrine toward Japan as a more capable military power and more fully committed U.S. ally. Abe's security orientation is not a transitory phenomenon, but rather the shape of things to come in Japanese security policy. The militarization of space policy stands as a harbinger of broader military transformation. Japan's space capabilities are now hiding less in plain sight and the implications for regional security come into sharper question. Japan will provide a strong and proactive contribution to the U. 
